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Liability for the acts of third parties: Kaizer v The Scottish 
Ministers considered 
 
Eleanor J Russell 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
The author considers the law in relation to liability for the acts of third parties, 
with a particular focus on the acts of those who have been released from or 
who are being held in custody. She then considers the most recent 
contribution to the jurisprudence in this area, namely the opinion of Lord Ericht 
in Kaizer v The Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110. 
 
Introduction 
The fact that a defender can, in certain circumstances, incur liability in respect 
of the acts of a third party is now well established. Guidance as to when such 
liability might attach is to be found in the well-known House of Lords’ 
judgments in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] A.C. 1004 and 
Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] A.C. 241 and these cases are 
revisited here. The article goes on to consider the issue of liability for the acts 
of those who have been released from custody or are being held in custody 
and examines, in particular, the recent opinion of Lord Ericht in Kaizer v The 
Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110.  
 
The legal background 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] A.C. 1004 provides authority at the 
highest judicial level that a defender may owe a duty of care to a pursuer in 
respect of the acts of a third party. Before considering Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, 
however, it is useful to have regard to some earlier cases. There is early 
Scottish authority which recognises that a defender may owe a duty of care in 
respect of the acts of third parties. In Scott’s Trustees v Moss (1889) 17.R. 32, 
the occupant of a recreation ground advertised that a descent from a balloon 
would be made by parachute within the grounds at a given time. The descent 
was made into a field of turnips on a farm adjoining the grounds and a crowd 
which had gathered outside the grounds rushed in and damaged the fences 
and turnips. The occupant of the turnip field brought an action for damages 
against the occupant of the recreation ground. It was averred that the descent 
into the cultivated ground might have been foreseen by the defender, that the 
gathering of the crowd and the damage was the natural and probable result of 
the defender’s actings and that the defender was liable for the damage 
caused by his fault or negligence. The Inner House held the action to be 
relevant. Lord Shand stated (at p.37) 
“I agree that in the ordinary case the mere bringing of a crowd together does 
not lead to the inference that the person who has been instrumental in 
assembling the crowd is answerable for its actings. I think the principle which 
ought to receive effect is that if the collection of the crowd, and the actings of 
the crowd, are the natural and probable consequence of the action of the 
defender—a consequence which the defender ought to have foreseen,—then 
the case is relevant.” 
Some years later, in Smith v. Leurs (1945) 70 C.L.R. 256, Dixon J. stated (at 
pp. 261-262): 
"But, apart from vicarious responsibility, one man may be responsible to 
another for the harm done to the latter by a third person; he may be 
responsible on the ground that the act of the third person could not have 
taken place but for his own fault or breach of duty. There is more than one 
description of duty the breach of which may produce this consequence. For 
instance, it may be a duty of care in reference to things involving special 
danger. It may even be a duty of care with reference to the control of actions 
or conduct of the third person. It is, however, exceptional to find in the law a 
duty to control another's actions to prevent harm to strangers. The general 
rule is that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to prevent his 
doing damage to a third. There are, however, special relations which are the 
source of a duty of this nature." (emphasis added) 
The question in the leading case of Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office was 
whether the general rule or the exception to it applied: in other words, did 
“special relations” exist. The alleged facts of Dorset Yacht Co Ltd were as 
follows. A party of boys was undertaking Borstal training on Brownsea Island 
in Poole Harbour under the supervision and control of three Borstal officers. 
One night, in breach of their instructions, the officers simply went to bed 
leaving the trainees to their own devices. Seven of the boys escaped and 
boarded a yacht in the vicinity. They collided with the plaintiffs’ yacht, the 
Silver Mist, which was moored nearby. They then boarded the Silver Mist and 
did further damage to it. The plaintiffs sued the Home Office for damages. The 
question of law for their Lordships’ consideration was whether the Home 
Office or the Borstal officers owed any duty of care to the plaintiffs capable of 
giving rise to liability in damages. By a majority (Viscount Dilhorne dissenting), 
the House of Lords held that there was sufficient proximity between the 
borstal officers and the plaintiffs to result in the imposition of a duty of care 
owed by the former to the latter. Lord Reid stated that if the officers had 
obeyed their instructions they could and would have prevented the trainees 
from escaping. All the escaping trainees had criminal records and five of them 
had a record of absconding from Borstal institutions. The three officers knew 
or ought to have known that the trainees would probably try to escape during 
the night, would take some vessel for that purpose and would probably cause 
damage to it or another vessel. There were numerous vessels moored in the 
harbour, and the trainees could readily board one of them. It was a likely 
consequence of the officers’ neglect of duty that the plaintiffs' yacht would 
suffer damage.  
For Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, the risk of the boys interfering with a yacht 
and damaging it was “glaringly obvious” (at p.1034) and the principle 
expressed by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31 
applied. Lord Morris stated (at p.1037-8): “If A can reasonably foresee that 
some act or omission of his may have the result that loss or damage may be 
suffered by B who is someone who would be closely and directly affected by 
the act or omission, there will be some circumstances in which a legal duty 
will be owed by A to B and some in which it will not. The question arises as to 
what is the dividing line and on which side the present case falls. The fact that 
the immediate damage suffered by B may have been caused by C does not 
affect the question whether A owed a duty to B; such fact would only relate to 
a question whether the act or omission of A did result in damage to B. Some 
act on the part of C might be the very kind of thing which would be likely to 
happen if there was a breach of duty by A.” 
As to on what side of the dividing line the instant case fell, Lord Morris stated 
(under reference to Smith v. Leurs (1945) 70 C.L.R. 256, supra), that there 
was “a special relation” in that the officers were entitled to exercise control 
over boys who, to the officers’ knowledge, might wish to escape and who 
might well damage property nearby. It followed that a duty of care was owed 
by the officers to the owners of the nearby yachts. 
Lord Pearson, having also referred to Smith v. Leurs, and having stated the 
general rule “that one man is under no duty of controlling another man to 
prevent his doing damage to a third” also took the view that Dorset Yacht fell 
under the exception to the rule. This resulted from the special relation which 
existed. Lord Pearson stated (at p.1055): “The Borstal boys were under the 
control of the defendants' officers, and control imports responsibility. The 
boys' interference with the boats appears to have been a direct result of the 
defendants' officers' failure to exercise proper control and supervision.” 
Lord Diplock observed that this was the first time that the specific question of 
liability for the acts of third parties had been posed at a higher judicial level 
than that of a county court (although, of course, in Scotland, the matter had 
been considered by the Inner House in Scott’s Trustees v Moss, supra). His 
Lordship stated (at p.1061): “This appeal…raises the lawyer's question: "Am I 
my brother's keeper?" A question which may also receive a restricted reply.” 
Lord Diplock proceeded to state his view as follows (at pp.1070-1):  
“[A]ny duty of a Borstal officer to use reasonable care to prevent a Borstal 
trainee from escaping from his custody was owed only to persons whom he 
could reasonably foresee had property situate in the vicinity of the place of 
detention of the detainee which the detainee was likely to steal or to 
appropriate and damage in the course of eluding immediate pursuit and 
recapture.”  
His Lordship continued (at p.1071):  
“In the present appeal the place from which the trainees escaped was an 
island from which the only means of escape would presumably be a boat 
accessible from the shore of the island. There is thus material fit for 
consideration at the trial for holding that the plaintiff, as the owner of a boat 
moored off the island, fell within the category of persons to whom a duty of 
care to prevent the escape of the trainees was owed by the officers 
responsible for their custody.”  
The facts in Maloco v Littlewoods Organisation Ltd [1987] A.C. 241 were quite 
different. There, the defenders purchased a cinema with a view to 
demolishing it and replacing it with a supermarket. During the preliminary 
works, young persons obtained access to the premises at night. Some fire 
raising attempts occurred on the premises but the defenders were not 
informed of these incidents. Subsequently, a fire was deliberately started, 
resulting in serious damage to neighbouring properties, the owners of which 
sought reparation from Littlewoods. Lord Goff outlined three situations in 
which a duty of care in respect of the acts of a third party would arise. Firstly, 
such a duty would arise in cases where there existed a special relationship 
between either (a) the defender and pursuer based on an assumption of 
responsibility or (b) the defender and the third party, such as one whereby the 
defender is responsible for controlling the third party. Secondly, a duty would 
arise where the defender negligently created a source of danger upon his 
property and it was reasonably foreseeable that a third party would interfere 
and cause damage. Thirdly, a duty would arise where the defender has 
knowledge of third party interference on his property but fails to take 
reasonable steps to abate it. In the circumstances of the case, no duty arose. 
None of the three situations outlined above applied. It was significant that 
Littlewoods had no knowledge of the previous fire raising attempts.   
 
The authorities in respect of those released from custody  
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd concerned the escape (rather than the release) of 
Borstal trainees from an open institution. In approaching the duty issue, Lord 
Diplock focused on the need for special relations between the plaintiffs and 
defendants which must expose the person “to a particular risk of damage in 
consequence of that escape which is different in its incidence from the 
general risk of damage from criminal acts of others which he shares with all 
members of the public” (p.1070). In Lord Diplock’s view, the duty was owed 
only to those with property situated in the vicinity of the island from which the 
borstal boys escaped and he cautioned against recognising a duty to a wider 
category of the public. (See, also, Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 
[1989] A.C. 53 where the last victim of the Yorkshire Ripper, Jacqueline Hill, 
was held to be at no special risk from the activities of the Yorkshire Ripper. 
There was thus insufficient proximity of relationship between the police and 
Miss Hill to result in the imposition of a duty of care upon the defendant. Lord 
Keith stated (at p.62): “Miss Hill was one of a vast number of the female 
general public who might be at risk from [the Ripper’s] activities but was at no 
special distinctive risk in relation to them, unlike the owners of yachts moored 
off Brownsea Island.”)  It should be noted that Lord Diplock, in his speech in 
Dorset Yacht, distinguished (at pp.1070-1071) between an escaped prisoner 
and one who is released. How then have the courts responded to claims 
made in respect of injury or damage inflicted by those who have been 
released from custody? Both the Scottish and English courts have had 
occasion to consider such claims, with each case turning on its own specific 
facts.  
In Thomson v Scottish Ministers 2013 S.C. 628 the pursuer’s daughter was 
murdered by a prisoner who had been released on “short leave.” The pursuer 
sought damages from the Scottish Ministers as representing the Scottish 
Prison Service (SPS). The pursuer averred that the SPS knew or ought to 
have known that, when released on leave, the prisoner posed a real and 
immediate risk of danger to those persons with whom he would be expected 
to have dealings during his weekend release, including the pursuer’s 
daughter. Following debate, the Lord Ordinary dismissed the action as 
irrelevant. The pursuer reclaimed. The Second Division recognised that each 
of the elements of the tripartite test (reasonable foreseeability, proximity and 
policy: see Caparo Industries Ltd v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605) was a 
necessary, if not sufficient, ingredient for the imposition of a duty of care. The 
court concluded that no duty of care was owed to the deceased. In cases of 
this kind, the pursuer required to establish a special relationship which 
exposed the deceased to a particular risk of damage as a result of negligence 
by the defenders in the context of that relationship; or that the victim was the 
subject of a special or distinct risk in consequence of the defender's actions. 
The Division concluded that the Lord Ordinary had been correct to find there 
was no “proximity” between the deceased and the SPS. As far as policy was 
concerned, the Lord Justice-Clerk (Carloway) made the following significant 
observation (at para.59): 
“[I]f liability were to be imposed upon the SPS on such a tenuous basis as is 
advanced, it would potentially render the SPS and perhaps also the Parole 
Board open to claims from any person who became a victim of a prisoner 
released before the mandatory date of his/her liberty. Such a regime would 
have potentially serious consequences for the proper functioning of both 
these institutions in the care and rehabilitation of prisoners and hence to 
society as a whole.” 
The reclaiming motion was refused. 
In Palmer v Tees Health Authority  [2000] P.I.Q.R. P1 the Court of Appeal 
held that a custody authority responsible for the release of an allegedly 
dangerous psychiatric patient did not owe a duty to a four year old child whom 
the patient murdered. If the identity of the victim was unknown, there was 
insufficient proximity of relationship between the defendants and the victim. A 
similar result ensued in K v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] EWCA Civ 775. There, the Secretary of State released a dangerous 
sex offender into the community, notwithstanding a court recommendation 
that he be deported. Following the offender’s release, he raped the claimant. 
Her action against the Secretary of State was struck out as the averred facts 
did not support an allegation of proximity between the claimant and the 
Secretary of State. 
 
Liability of public custodians for the criminal acts of those in their care 
In both Scotland and England, some victims of assaults which have been 
carried out in a prison setting have brought claims in negligence against the 
relevant prison authorities. As with all negligence actions, it is incumbent upon 
the pursuer in such cases to establish that he was owed a duty of care and 
that breach of that duty was causative of his loss. Such cases have turned on 
their own facts and circumstances. Looking first at the Scottish authorities, in 
Leslie v Secretary of State for Scotland 1999 Rep L.R. 39 a prisoner was 
assaulted by another prisoner, as a result of which he lost his left eye. The 
assault happened in a prison corridor when the pursuer and other prisoners 
were making their way from the accommodation halls to the worksheds. The 
attacking prisoner stopped in the corridor telling warders that he wished to 
speak to another prisoner. When the pursuer appeared in the corridor he was 
assaulted with a makeshift knife. There was evidence at the proof that the 
pursuer’s attacker was not known by the prison authorities to pose any 
greater risk than normal and, in those circumstances, the Secretary of State 
was found not to have been negligent. In the course of his opinion, the Lord 
Ordinary (Nimmo Smith) stated (at para.7.05):  
“[T]here was no evidence to support the averments about a previous history of 
violence on the part of [the attacker]. Entirely different considerations would 
arise if a prisoner with a known history of violence towards other prisoners 
was able to loiter without being moved on, all the more so if he was known to 
be ill disposed towards an individual prisoner who might be exposed to attack. 
But these considerations do not arise in the present case, and there was no 
reason to regard [the attacker] as posing any particular risk of violence 
towards other prisoners, including the pursuer.”  
In Whannel v Secretary of State for Scotland 1989 S.L.T. 671, on the other 
hand, an inmate of Polmont borstal succeeded in an action against the 
Secretary of State in respect of stabbing injuries inflicted by a fellow inmate in 
the kitchen. Lord Morton held that the kitchen staff should have been told 
about the attacker’s past history of violence and bullying. If they had been told 
they would have kept the attacker under close supervision. Lord Morton 
stated (at p.674):  
“If that had been done it would seem on the evidence most unlikely that [the 
attacker] would have been able to obtain a knife or use it on the pursuer. I 
consider that the stabbing of the pursuer was an incident of a kind such as 
might have been anticipated if there was no communication to the kitchen 
staff about [the attacker’s] previous history and propensities.”  
In Hendrie v The Scottish Ministers 2002 Rep L.R. 46 a prison officer sought 
damages from the Scottish Ministers in respect of injuries to his back which 
he sustained when he intervened in a fight between two inmates at Polmont 
Young Offenders Institution. Lord Kingarth held that information that there had 
been a physical altercation between the two inmates the previous weekend 
and that the matter was unresolved, would not, of itself, suffice for liability to 
be established. However, the existence of additional circumstances, namely 
knowledge that one of the inmates was due to be transferred out the following 
day, and that it was possible that a weapon had been involved meant that the 
safe and reasonable step would have been to transfer one of the two inmates 
out of the west wing pending the imminent removal. The pursuer’s action 
succeeded. 
There is also authority from south of the border to the effect that a duty of care 
may be owed by prison authorities to prisoners to protect them from injury at 
the hands of fellow prisoners who are under the prison’s control: see Palmer v 
The Home Office, Court of Appeal, 25 March 1988 (unreported) 1988 WL 
1609043 and Stenning v Secretary of State for The Home Office [2002] 
EWCA Civ 793 (see para.45). In neither of those cases was liability 
established however- in Palmer because there was no particular risk posed by 
the assailant and in Stenning because previous threats made by the attacker 
were of a generalised nature only. Some older English authorities (which 
predate the decision in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd) are also instructive. In Ellis v 
Home Office [1953] 2 All E.R. 149 the plaintiff, while detained as a remand 
prisoner in Winchester Prison, suffered injuries following a brutal attack by 
another prisoner who was mentally defective. The plaintiff sought damages 
from the Home Office. The assailant, however, had given the authorities no 
reason to suspect that he was liable to violence. Devlin J. therefore found for 
the defendants on the basis that, as there was no reason to anticipate an act 
of violence, negligence had not been established. The Court of Appeal upheld 
the judgment and Singleton L.J. stated (at p.154): 
“The duty on those responsible for one of Her Majesty's prisons is to take 
reasonable care for the safety of those who are within, and that includes those 
who are within against their wish or will, of whom the plaintiff was one. If it is 
proved that supervision is lacking, and that accused persons have access to 
instruments, and that an incident occurs of a kind such as might be 
anticipated, I think it might well be said that those who are responsible for the 
good government of the prison have failed to take reasonable care for the 
safety of those under their care.” 
In D'Arcy v Prison Commissioners, The Times, November 17, 1955, the 
plaintiff, while a prisoner in Parkhurst Prison, sustained injuries at the hands 
of fellow prisoners. He alleged negligence against the Prison Commissioners. 
The Commissioners did not deny that they were subject to a duty to take 
reasonable care and the jury found in favour of the plaintiff. 
In Dorset Yacht Co Ltd, Lord Morris, under reference to both Ellis and D’Arcy, 
considered it “eminently reasonable” (at p.1040) that those in charge of the 
prison owe a prisoner (who is clearly not free to order his own movements) a 
duty to take reasonable care to protect him from being assaulted by a fellow-
prisoner who may have shown himself to be one who might cause harm. In 
those two cases, his Lordship noted, the defendants had the power to control 
the persons who caused injury to the respective plaintiffs. Lord Diplock, in 
turn, in Dorset Yacht, accepted the Ellis and D’Arcy decisions as correct. He 
observed that in both cases, the attacking prisoner was in the actual custody 
of the defendant at the time of his tortious act and the relationship between 
them gave to the defendant a continuing power of physical control over the 
acts of the prisoner. In addition, in each case, the defendant, in the exercise 
of a legal right and physical power of custody and control of the plaintiff, had 
required him to be in a position in which the defendant ought reasonably and 
probably to have foreseen that he was likely to be injured by his fellow 
prisoner. Lord Diplock stated (at p.1062): 
“In my view, it is the combination of these two characteristics, one of the 
relationship between the defendant custodian and the person actually 
committing the wrong to the plaintiff and the other of the relationship between 
the defendant and the plaintiff, which supply the reason for the existence of 
the duty of care in these two cases…The latter characteristic would be 
present also in the relationship between the defendant and any other person 
admitted to the prison who sustained similar damage from the tortious act of a 
prisoner, since the Home Office as occupiers and managers of the prison 
have the legal right to control the admission and the movements of a visitor 
while he is on the prison premises. A similar duty of care would thus be owed 
to him.” 
Previous decisions of the English courts (including Ellis and D’Arcy) allowed 
Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd to arrive, by induction, at the following 
proposition (at pp.1063 -1064):  
"A is responsible for damage caused to the person or property of B by the 
tortious act of C (a person responsible in law for his own acts) where the 
relationship between A and C has the characteristics (1) that A has the legal 
right to detain C in penal custody and to control his acts while in custody; (2) 
that A is actually exercising his legal right of custody of C at the time of C's 
tortious act and (3) that A if he had taken reasonable care in the exercise of 
his right of custody could have prevented C from doing the tortious act which 
caused damage to the person or property of B; and where also the 
relationship between A and B has the characteristics (4) that at the time of C's 
tortious act A has the legal right to control the situation of B or his property as 
respects physical proximity to C and (5) that A can reasonably foresee that B 
is likely to sustain damage to his person or property if A does not take 
reasonable care to prevent C from doing tortious acts of the kind which he 
did."  
It would be in accordance with this approach that Lord Ericht would direct 
himself in the Scottish case of Kaizer v Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110, 
to which attention is now turned. 
 
Kaizer v The Scottish Ministers [2017] CSOH 110 
The facts and circumstances of Kaizer were as follows. On 4 December 2009, 
while the pursuer was on remand at Aberdeen Prison, he was assaulted by a 
fellow prisoner, Keith Porter. The pursuer, a Polish National, was exercising in 
the prison gym when Mr Porter swung a bar bell at his head and fractured his 
skull. Mr Porter was subsequently convicted of attempted murder, the jury 
taking the view that the crime was racially motivated. The pursuer was left 
with headaches, concentration problems and other psychological difficulties 
following the attack. He sought damages at common law against the Scottish 
Ministers, as being responsible for the Scottish Prison Service. The pursuer 
asserted that the attack was in implementation of a threat made to him by his 
assailant in the gym around a week earlier when, following a discussion about 
the use of a certain machine, Porter had threatened to “smash [Kaizer’s] 
fucking Polish face in.” The pursuer averred that he informed a prison officer, 
Gary Lumsden, of the threat at the time but Lumsden failed to report the 
incident. The case came before Lord Ericht on a proof as to liability.  
The defenders accepted that the Scottish Prison Service had a duty to take 
reasonable care for the safety of those within the prisons which it operated, 
including the prisoners. They accepted that that duty may extend to taking 
reasonable steps to avoid a foreseeable risk of a prisoner sustaining injury at 
the hands of a fellow prisoner. However, they submitted that what the duty of 
care required, and what would amount to negligence, would vary according to 
the facts of the particular case.  
Lord Ericht identified (at para.4) the “classic statement” of the law in this area 
as that of Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd where the five characteristics 
required for the imposition of liability had been set out (the relevant dictum is 
quoted above). Senior counsel for the pursuer argued that all five 
characteristics were satisfied in the instant case. In particular, it was 
submitted that, in relation to characteristic (5), it was reasonably foreseeable 
that a threat of violence may lead to actual violence and, in relation to 
characteristic (3), the attempted murder would not have occurred but for the 
failures of the defenders.  
Lord Ericht observed (at para.49) that it was “well established in law” that 
prison authorities can be liable for assaults by one prisoner on another, but 
each case turned on its facts and circumstances. Having heard the evidence 
in the instant case, Lord Ericht found that Mr Porter had threatened the 
pursuer in the manner described and that this was reported to prison officer, 
Gary Lumsden, who had been in the office at the time. Accordingly, Mr 
Lumsden was aware that the pursuer was at risk from Mr Porter. Between 26 
November and 3 December, however, Mr Porter was at HM Prison Barlinnie 
in connection with a court appearance in Glasgow and was not therefore in a 
position to carry out his threat. He did, however, assault the pursuer on 4 
December, the day after his return. On that day, Mr Porter was in the gym 
with other prisoners, including Mr Rusek (another Pole), Mr Stewart and Mr 
Porter. Following an exchange of words between Mr Rusek and Mr Stewart, 
Mr Rusek was attacked by three people. Mr Porter then launched his attack 
upon the pursuer. Counsel for the defenders submitted that it was doubtful to 
what extent, if at all, the November incident and the assault were connected, 
given that it occurred during an attack by three other inmates on another 
Polish prisoner, Mr Rusek. Lord Ericht took the view, however, that the 
assault by Mr Porter on the pursuer was a “separate attack” which did not 
commence until the attack on Mr Rusek was underway. The attack was 
directed to the pursuer’s face and head, which was consistent with the earlier 
threat to smash his face in. Accordingly, Lord Ericht held that the attack on the 
pursuer on 4 December was in implementation of the threat made by Mr 
Porter around a week earlier.  
At the time of the attack, Mr Murray was the only prison officer on duty in the 
gym. The upper floor of the gym building contained a weights room and an 
office. The office was entered through a door from the weights room and 
contained a large window, from which part, but not all, of the weights room 
could be seen. Mr Murray was in the office when his attention was attracted 
by a movement of the three prisoners towards Mr Rusek, which he saw 
through the window. He went out into the gym and saw Mr Porter standing 
with the bar bell above his head. Mr Murray screamed at Porter who stepped 
back and threw the bar down. Perceiving the pursuer to be in danger, Mr 
Murray pulled him into the office.  
At the proof, expert evidence was led by both the pursuer and the defenders. 
The pursuer led the evidence of John McCaig, a consultant in prison 
management, while the defenders led the evidence of Philip Wheatley, a 
former Director General of the Prison Service in England and Wales.  
It was common ground between the expert witnesses that the November 
incident should have been reported by Mr Lumsden and indeed, Lord Ericht 
so held. The parties and their experts disagreed, however, as to what the 
consequences of such a report would have been and this was germane to the 
question of causation, namely whether it was more likely than not that the 
attempted murder would not have taken place.  
Mr McCaig’s opinion was that if Mr Lumsden had reported the incident, the 
pursuer and Mr Porter would possibly not have been in the gymnasium at the 
same time on 4 December 2009. Even if they had, it was most likely that Mr 
Murray would have been aware of the investigation and the circumstances 
and it was therefore less likely that there would have been an unsupervised 
window of opportunity for Mr Porter to attack the pursuer. Mr Wheatley’s 
opinion, on the other hand, was that segregation from other prisoners would 
have been the only reliable way of “removing the risk of a serious assault by 
Mr Porter” (at para.38) and it would have been unlikely that enough evidence 
would have been provided in order to segregate Mr Porter before 4 December 
2009. Lord Ericht observed (at para.42) however that it was not “the general 
question of risk” which was relevant. Rather, “it [was] whether the particular 
attack which actually did occur on a particular day in a particular occasion 
could have been prevented.” 
Lord Ericht did not accept Mr Wheatley’s evidence that segregation was the 
only action which would have prevented the assault. He preferred the 
evidence of Mr McCaig in whose opinion the assault would not have 
happened if Mr Murray had not left the weights room to go into the office to 
answer the phone. Mr McCaig’s view was that if Mr Murray had been 
forewarned of the prior incident and was seen to be closely observing the 
prisoners, it would be much less likely that the assault would have happened. 
Very rarely was there an assault in view of a member of staff.  
Lord Ericht stated (at para.44): 
“Had [Mr Murray] been aware of the previous incident and so not left the room 
unsupervised by going to the office to answer the telephone, it seems to me 
more likely than not that his authority and presence would have prevented the 
assault taking place in the first place. I accept the evidence of Mr McCaig, 
based on his experience of prisons, to the effect that the presence of a prison 
officer is a deterrent to assault. It seems to me that the implementation that 
day in the gym of the threat made previously was opportunistic. Had the 
opportunity to implement the threat not arisen at that time and place, the 
particular attack for which damages are being sought in this action would not 
have taken place.”  
Lord Ericht concluded, on the balance of probabilities, that if Mr Lumsden had 
reported the threat, the attempted murder would not have taken place.  
Turning to the law, and having conducted a tour d’horizon of the relevant 
authorities, Lord Ericht sought to derive guidance from those cases in relation 
to the established facts in the instant case. Different considerations applied 
here than applied in Leslie where, it will be remembered, there was no reason 
to regard the assailant as posing any particular risk to the pursuer. In the 
instant case, by contrast, Lord Ericht observed (at para.52): “[A]s the threat 
had been reported to the prison officer, it was known that Porter was ill 
disposed towards the pursuer who might be exposed to attack, and there was 
reason to regard Porter as posing a particular risk of violence to the pursuer.”  
Having considered the facts and outcome in Whannel (where negligence was 
constituted by a failure on the part of the prison authorities to communicate 
the assailant's violent history to members of the borstal kitchen staff) Lord 
Ericht stated that the assault upon Mr Kaizer “was an incident of a kind such 
as might have been anticipated if there was no communication onwards to the 
prison authorities by Mr Lumsden of the threat which had been reported to 
him.” Under reference to Hendrie, Lord Ericht noted (at para.56) that in the 
instant case “the threat and the reporting of it, which demonstrate a particular 
continuing risk of assault, are additional circumstances beyond a mere 
altercation in the gym.” (emphasis added) 
Lord Ericht went on to observe that in the instant case, a particular risk was 
constituted by the threat (cf Palmer v The Home Office, Court of Appeal, 25 
March 1988 (unreported) 1988 WL 1609043). The threat was of a particular 
type of attack on a particular prisoner (cf Stenning v Secretary of State for The 
Home Office [2002] EWCA Civ 793).  
Having conducted his review of the authorities, Lord Ericht stated (at para.62):  
“In the light of that case-law, in my opinion, the facts of the current case fall 
within the circumstances in which prison authorities can be liable for assaults 
by one prisoner on another. The threat which was made by Mr Porter and 
reported to Mr Lumsden demonstrated that the pursuer was at particular risk 
of violent attack.”  
His Lordship concluded (at para.63):  
“Mr Porter made a specific threat to smash the pursuer’s face in. The pursuer 
informed Mr Lumsden of the threat. Mr Lumsden should have reported the 
threat, but he failed to do so. Mr Lumsden did not take reasonable care to 
prevent the implementation of the threat by reporting it. It was reasonably 
foreseeable that the pursuer was likely to sustain damage to his person if 
such reasonable care was not taken. Had Mr Lumsden reported the threat, on 
the balance of probabilities the attempted murder would not have taken place. 
Accordingly, all the five requirements of Dorset Yacht have been fulfilled. I find 
in favour of the pursuer in relation to liability.”  




It is now well established that, in certain circumstances, a defender can be 
liable for the acts of third parties. At a more specific level, it is also clear that 
prison authorities may incur liability for assaults by one prisoner upon another. 
Claims in damages by prisoners are on the increase (as acknowledged in the 
editor’s note at 7.08 in Leslie) and the impecuniosity of most attackers makes 
it likely that the prison authorities will be the target of any such litigation. 
The courts are not blind to the difficulties faced by prison authorities in the 
management of prisoners, a point acknowledged in Lord Ericht’s opinion in 
Kaizer (at para.49) and in the earlier case of Palmer v The Home Office, Court 
of Appeal, 25 March 1988 (unreported) 1988 WL 1609043. In Palmer, Lord 
Justice Neill stated that “[t]hose in charge of prisoners have a difficult task. 
Clearly, except in extreme cases, of which obviously there are some, those 
responsible for prisons cannot keep prisoners permanently locked up or 
segregated from other prisoners.” The courts are alive to the need for prison 
authorities to balance considerations of prisoner safety with other 
considerations such as rehabilitation of inmates (see, e.g. Stenning, supra, at 
para.48). Liability will not necessarily result in every case where one prisoner 
is assaulted by another-the outcome in each case will, of course, be fact 
sensitive. Nonetheless, where specific threats are made by one prisoner to 
another and made known to prison officials, it is clear that those threats 
should be reported and appropriate supervision put in place. If that is not 
done, and the threat is then implemented, it seems likely, following Kaizer, 
that the prison authority will incur liability. 
The outcome in Kaizer offers up a salutary lesson to prison authorities. They 
should take heed of this important judgment. Should they choose to ignore it, 
they do so at their peril. 
  
